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EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TRADE POLICIES
VIS-A-VIS KOREA AND TAIWAN IN THE
EIGHTIES: A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE
Jean-FranqoisBellis *
1.

INTRODUCTION

This article will review the trade policies of the European Community towards Korea and Taiwan over the past ten years. This time
period has been chosen for two reasons. In the first place, ten years
ago, on November 28, 1979, the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade
negotiations was concluded.t At that time, the Tokyo Round was the
most comprehensive GATT negotiating round ever, both in terms of
trade value affected and in terms of its coverage of topics.2 An interesting question, therefore, is to what extent the 1979 commitments to
trade liberalization were actually kept. Secondly, during the last decade countries such as Korea and Taiwan have become extremely competitive and have started to become a threat to European
manufacturers. 3 In addition, the EC has run a persistent trade deficit
with these countries in recent years. 4 It is only against such a background that one can expect trade policy responses.
It will be seen that the European Community has not, thus far,
established a coordinated trade policy to react to the changing realities
of international trade and worldwide shifts of economic power
(although some would argue that 1992 is Europe's answer). Rather,
the EC authorities have chosen to assist beleaguered domestic industries in a stopgap fashion by relying on existing trade protection in* Partner, Van Bael & Bellis, Brussels. The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful
assistance of Edwin Vermulst and Thomas Hinterseer in the preparation of this article.
1. For an overview of Tokyo Round accomplishments, see J. JACKSON, J. Louis & M. MATSUSHITA, IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND, NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RULES (1984).

2. For an overview, see 2 GATT, THE TOKYO ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS,

SUPPLEMENTARY

REPORT

BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL

OF GATT, at Annex G

(1980).
3. For an interesting review and analysis of the economic development of Pacific Asia, see
Park, The Little Dragons and Structural Change in Pacific Asia, 12 WORLD ECON. 125 (1989).
4. The trade deficit with Korea was 2.3 billion ECU in 1987 and 2.6 billion ECU in 1988.
The trade deficit with Taiwan was 3.2 billion ECU in 1987 and 3.5 billion ECU in 1988.
EUROSTAT.
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struments and unilaterally creating new ones where the existing
instruments did not suffice. 5 Thus far, Japan and Korea (and, more
recently, Hong Kong) 6 have been the prime targets of the EC authorities. For reasons explained below, 7 Taiwan has managed to stay out of
the shooting range.
2.

THE ANTIDUMPING LAW

Since 1979, the trade policy instrument used most frequently by
the Community to stem the tide of competitive imports has been the
antidumping law. 8 Surely, the Community does not distinguish itself
in this respect from other developed countries with adjustment
problems, such as the United States, Canada and Australia. 9 The
reasons for the relative popularity of the antidumping instrument compared to other trade measures such as safeguard actions,' 0 countervailing duties' 1 and actions pursuant to the EC's new commercial
policy instrument' 2 would seem to be:
-antidumping action offers the possibility to attack selective targets (an
advantage compared to safeguards);
-antidumping action directly controls the prices in the EC, especially
5. For an overview of such instruments, see I. VAN BAEL & J. BELLIS, ANTIDUMPING AND
OTHER TRADE PROTECTION LAWS OF THE EC (2d ed. 1990).
6. The following cases have been initiated against Hong Kong during the last few years:
Notice of Extension of the Anti-dumping Proceeding Concerning Imports of Certain Cellular
Mobile Telephones, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 71) 12 (1988); Council Regulation Imposing a
Definitive Anti-dumping Duty on Imports of Video Cassettes, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 174)
1, 14 (1989) [hereinafter Video Cassettes]; Decision Concerning Small Screen Colour Televisions,
32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 314) 1, 14 (1989) [hereinafter Small Screen Colour Televisions];
Decision Concerning Photo Albums, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 322) 9 (1989); Notice of Initiation of an Anti-dumping Proceeding Concerning Certain Imports of Audio Cassettes and Audio
Cassette Tapes, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 11) 9 (1989); Notice of Initiation of Anti-dumping
Proceeding Concerning Imports of Silicon Metal, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 26) 8 (1989);
Notice of Initiation of an Anti-dumping Proceeding Concerning Imports of 'Denim,' 32 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. C 73) 3 (1989). The spate of antidumping actions and the disastrous initial
results in the video tape case were important reasons for the unique decision of the Hong Kong
government at the end of 1988 to retain specialized counsel to assist it in antidumping
proceedings.
7. See infra section 2.
8. For overviews of the EC antidumping law, see VAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 5; E.
VERMULST, ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES

(1987); J. BESELER

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

&

A.

WILLIAMS, ANTI-DUMPING AND ANTI-SUBSIDY LAW:

(1986).

9. See ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (J. Jackson, E.
Vermulst eds. 1989).
10. Council Regulation on Common Rules for Imports, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 35) 1
(1982), amended in Commission 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 37) 1 (1987).
11. Council Regulation on Protection Against Dumped or Subsidized Imports, 31 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 209) 1 (1988).
12. Council Regulation on Protection Against Illicit Commercial Practices, 27 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 252) 1 (1984).
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since the introduction of article 13 (11) in 198813 (an advantage compared to safeguards, countervailing duties and the new instrument);
-antidumping action is concerned with the behavior of private companies and there is, therefore, no need to consult with foreign Governments (an advantage compared to safeguards, countervailing duties
and the new instrument); and
-antidumping action is a response to unfair trade; there is therefore no
compensation requirement (an advantage compared to safeguards).14
Nevertheless, one may wonder why there has been such an exponential increase in the use of antidumping actions - both ratione
materiae and ratione loci - since 1979. The most important reasons
would seem to be the recession in Europe in the early eighties coupled
with the increased competitiveness of countries in Pacific Asia, and the
realization by European industries - varying from powerful trade associations such as CEFIC, EACEM and Eurofer to ad hoc coalitions
of industrial groups such as the European paint brush and photo album manufacturers - that invocation of the antidumping law (often
in the aftermath of failed industry-to-industry restraint negotiations)
as a means of limiting the influx of competitively-priced imports offers
high chances of success. Indeed, even if the European industry does
not succeed in obtaining the relief (or the extent of relief) it requests,
the mere initiation of an antidumping proceeding has a chilling effect
on trade, especially in the case of newly industrialized economies
(NIEs) and developing economies which rely heavily on independent
distributors within the EC (as opposed to countries such as Japan and
the United States which tend to have sales subsidiaries within the EC).
Such distributors are likely to go shopping for other producers that are
not under attack as soon as a case is opened. Furthermore, a wellorchestrated defense of an antidumping proceeding involves significant
financial (legal fees) 15 and other (manpower) burdens which press once again - especially on small producers in NIEs and developing
countries.
While antidumping action is the favored trade protection weapon
of import-competing industries in Australia, Canada, the Community
13. For a critical analysis of the amendments to the Antidumping Regulation, introduced in
1988, see Bellis, Vermulst & Waer, Further Changes in the EEC Anti-dumping Regulation: A
Codification of ControversialMethodologies, 23 J. WORLD TRADE 21 (1989).
14. See Bellis, The EEC Antidumping System, in ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 9, at 41.

15. Legal fees for a trade proceeding in the EC, however, tend to be lower than similar fees in
the United States. For a pioneering study of the latter, see Jackson, Perspectives on the Jurisprudence of International Trade: Costs and Benefits of Legal Procedures in the United States, 82
MICH. L. REV. 1570 (1984).
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and the United States,' 6 it is important to bear in mind that an antidumping case also has relative advantages for the foreign producers,
that is, if one accepts the proposition that domestically powerful but
internationally less competitive industries in the four jurisdictions
mentioned above need some kind of safety valve to adjust to the
changing realities of global competition. Indeed, it seems naive to
think that such industries would just throw their hands in the air and
give up; they can be expected to fight for survival by any means. Compared with other possible trade actions, an antidumping case is not
that bad for the foreign producers because it offers the opportunity to
emerge intact, and sometimes even stronger than before.
Korea is an excellent example of this thesis. At least in the Community, Korean companies have generally obtained very good - and
compared to other countries, unprecedented - results in antidumping
cases, as the following table shows.
Initiation
year
1981
1983
1985
1986
1986
1987
1987
1987

Product
B&W TVs
Saccharin
Cookware
Bicycle tires
Microwave ovens
Oxalic acid
Polyester yarn
CDPs

Result
No injury 17
No injury' 8
No injury1 9
Undertaking 20
Termination (no dumping) 2 1
Duties 22
(Low) duties 23
Duties 24

16. There are indications that the popularity of the antidumping instrument is spreading fast
to other countries, such as Mexico, Korea, Brazil and Pakistan, all of which have recently
adopted antidumping laws and are starting to use them.17. Commission Decision Terminating the Anti-dumping Proceeding Concerning Imports of
Certain Monochrome Television Sets, 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 364) 49 (1981).
18. Commission Decision Terminating the Anti-dumping Proceeding Concerning Imports of
Saccharin, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 352) 49 (1983).
19. Commission Decision Terminating the Anti-dumping Proceeding Concerning Imports of
Stainless Steel Household Cooking Ware, 29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 74) 33 (1986).
20. Commission Decision Accepting Undertakings Concerning Imports of Inner Tubes and
New Tire Casings, 31 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 134) 61 (1988) [hereinafter Inner Tubes and New
Tire Casings for Bicycles].
21. Commission Decision Terminating the Anti-dumping Proceeding on Imports of
Microwave Ovens, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 343) 33 (1988) [hereinafter Microwave Ovens].
22. Council Regulation Imposing a Definitive Anti-dumping Duty on Imports of Oxalic
Acid, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 184) 1 (1988) [hereinafter Oxalic Acid].
23. Council Regulation Imposing a Definitive Anti-dumping Duty on Imports of Polyester
Yarn, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 347) 10 (1988) [hereinafter Polyester Yarn].
24. Council Regulation Imposing a Provisional Anti-dumping Duty on Imports of Certain
Compact Disc Players, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 205) 5 (1989).
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Product

Result

1987

VCRs

Undertaking 25

1987
1988
1988
1988
1988

Video cassettes
Polyester film
SCTVs
Glutamic acid
Tungsten products

(Low) duties 26
No injury 27
Duties2 8
Undertaking 29
No injury 30

1988
1989

Photo albums
Audio cassettes

Undertaking
Pending

This table, however, and the Commission and Council Regulations
that form the basis for it do not tell the complete story. In particular,
one will search in vain for references to the long and arduous fights
that preceded adoption of some of the regulations and to the desperate
measures that the Commission occasionally considered (but eventually
deserted) to deal with the problem of Korean imports under the umbrella of antidumping action. A few telling examples may suffice.
In the course of the Microwave Ovens proceeding, 31 a case involving both Japanese and Korean producers, the Commission had come
to the conclusion relatively early that it was the surge in Korean exports that had caused injury to the EC industry. The Commission
was, however, unable to find significant dumping margins for the Korean producers Samsung, Goldstar and Daewoo on the basis of traditional dumping margin calculation methodology. 32 Faced with this
unsatisfactory situation, the Commission for some time actively considered reviving the old concept of currency dumping on the basis of
the theory that the Korean currency, the won, was undervalued. Because of internal opposition within the commission, this idea was eventually abandoned.
25. Council Decision Accepting Undertakings Concerning Video Cassette Recorders, 32 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 57) 61 (1989) [hereinafter Video Cassette Recorders].
26. Video Cassettes, supra note 6.
27. Decision Concerning Imports of Polyester Film, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 305) 31
(1989).
28. Small Screen Colour Televisions, supra note 6.
29. Notice of Initiation of Anti-dumping Proceeding on Imports of Glutamic Acid and Its
Salts, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 147) 3 (1988).
30. Notice of Anti-Dumping Proceeding Concerning Imports of Tungsten Carbide and
Fused Tungsten Carbide, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 322) 7 (1989).
31. Microwave Ovens, supra note 21.
32. While the Commission had found high dumping margins for the Japanese producers, it
had already become clear that the Japanese producers were not causing injury to the EC industry. Imposition of antidumping duties on Japan would therefore not have helped the EC
industry.
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In the Video Cassettes proceeding, 33 the Commission tried no less
than ten different methods of inflating the dumping margin for the
Korean companies Saehan, Goldstar, Sunkyong and Kolon. Most of
these methods focused on trying to find below-cost sales in Korea
(even though all indications were that the Korean video tape industry
was very profitable), some of which would have led to dumping margins as high as twenty-five to thirty-five percent. The Korean companies, however, fought such methods tooth and nail, with resulting
dumping margins ranging from 1.9 to 3.8 percent.
Finally the Video Cassette Recorders case 34 must be mentioned.
This case has ended rather disastrously - at least for the time being
for the Korean companies Samsung, Goldstar and Daewoo. It has
been the only case of importance (in terms of trade value of Korean
exports) with a bad result for Korea. The methods used by the Korean producers were less spectacular than those considered in the Microwave Ovens and Video Cassette Tapes proceedings, but - perhaps
for that very reason - they were harder to attack. The Commission
essentially took small bites out of a number of adjustments claimed by
the Korean companies on the domestic market such as duty drawback
and financing costs; the Commission also used a dubious model comparison. The combination of all these methods led to a finding of definitive dumping margins varying between seventeen and twenty-three
percent. In this respect, it should be noted that the Korean producers
did not contest that there was dumping but rather that the dumping
margins were so high.
An interesting side-issue is that, in the middle of the proceeding,
discussions were held between the European electronics industry
(EACEM) and the Korean electronics industry (EIAK) about "amicable" solutions, viz. industry-to-industry arrangements, not only with
respect to VCR exports but regarding a whole range of consumer electronics products. While these discussions were initially supported by
the Commission (indeed, high-level officials of Directorate-General I
attended the meetings), the Commission later withdrew its support after receiving signals from a number of Member States, in particular
the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark, that
restraint negotiations in the middle of the Uruguay Round were not
appreciated.
Faced with the prospect of having prohibitively high antidumping
duties imposed on their VCR exports, the Korean producers offered
33. Video Cassettes, supra note 6.
34. Video Cassette Recorders, supra note 25.
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undertakings within the framework of the EC's basic Antidumping
Regulation, which set minimum prices for Korean exports of VCRs to
the EC and for resales made by the companies' EC subsidiaries. The
Commission, however, made it clear that it did not consider these propositions sufficient because all three Korean producers were in the
process of setting up factories within the EC and they could therefore
reasonably be expected to start selling ex-EC factory before too long.
The Commission suggested that by analogy to article 13(10) (the anticircumvention provision of the basic Antidumping Regulation) the
undertakings contain an anticircumvention provision which would establish a minimum price ex-EC plant for as long as the Korean companies did not produce in the EC using at least forty percent nonKorean parts.
In the VCR proceeding, the Commission also ventilated some interesting views on why it considered it to be in the Community's interest to impose protective measures:
VCR production . . . involves technology which is transferable, with
some modifications, to other consumer electronics products. VCR production requires high-precision mechanics (micro-motors, heads, etc.)
and highly developed electronic circuitry. The loss of VCR production
capability would represent the loss of substantial technical know-how in
various important industrial fields and, in addition, it would seriously
weaken Community consumer electronics 35manufacturing capability in
general, both at present and in the future.
Not only does the above passage suggest that the Commission is
using the antidumping law as a tool for industrial policy, but it also
indicates that the Commission considers the production of video cassette recorders to constitute the centerpiece of modem technology, a
conclusion that few who have seen a production line for VCRs would
presumably share. It will be interesting to hear the Commission's rationale as to why protective measures in the on-going proceeding involving photo albums are in the Community interest.
Compared to Korea, Taiwan has had very few antidumping proceedings involving products with a major trade value, as the following
table illustrates.
35. Council Regulation Imposing Duty on Imports of Video Cassette Recorders, 31 O.J.

EUR. COMM. (No. L 240) 5, 15 (1988).

Michigan Journal of International Law
Initiation
year

Product

Result

Initiation
year

Product

Result

1981

Louvre doors

Undertaking 36

1982
1984
1984
1986
1988
1988
1988
1988
1988
1989

Iron/steel nuts
Louvre doors
Panel doors
Tube fittings
Bicycle tires
Oxalic acid
Polyester fibers
Polyester yarn
Glutamic acid 4 5
Dicumyl peroxide 46

Duties 4
Pending
Pending
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Termination 37
Termination 38
Termination 39
Termination40
Undertaking 4'
Duties42
Duties43

This seems to result from two intrinsic elements of the Taiwanese
economy. First, Taiwan does not have the equivalent of the famous
Korean "chaebols" or business conglomerates such as Hyundai, Samsung, Goldstar, Daewoo, Sunkyong, Kolon, etc., which attract attention internationally. Secondly, Taiwanese producers have focused on
manufacturing components rather than on finished products. This
low-key manufacturing strategy has the dual advantage of being less
conspicuous and less likely to lead to complaints from EC producers
who may be purchasing those very components from Taiwanese
suppliers.
Like Korea, the Taiwanese producers thus far have handled the
36. Commission Regulation Repealing a National Anti-dumping Duty on Louvre Doors, 24
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 158) 5 (1981).

37. Commission Decision Terminating the Review of Special Measures in Respect of Import
of Certain Nuts of Iron or Steel, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 254) 15 (1982).
38. Commission Regulation Cancelling the National Anti-dumping Duty on Imports of
Louvre Doors, 27 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 11) 13 (1984).
39. Commission Decision Terminating the Anti-dumping Proceeding Concerning Imports of
Exterior Panel Doors, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 16) 43 (1984).
40. Commission Decision Terminating the Anti-dumping Proceeding Concerning Imports of
Certain Tube and Pipe Fittings, 29 O.J. Eug. COMM. (No. L 313) 21 (1986).
41. Inner Tubes and New Tire Casings for Bicycles, supra note 20.
42. Oxalic Acid, supra note 22.
43. Council Regulation Concerning Imports of Synthetic Fibres of Polyesters, 31 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 348) 49 (1988).
44. Polyester Yarn, supra note 23.
45. Glutamic Acid and Its Salts, supra note 29.
46. Notice of Review and Initiation Concerning Imports of Dicumyl Peroxide, 32 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. C 39) 4 (1989).
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dumping and injury allegations of the EC industry well: most cases
were terminated without the imposition of protective measures. On
the other hand, the above table shows not only that, in the more recent
cases, antidumping duties are being imposed more often, but also that
dumping complaints against Taiwan are increasing. This trend can be
expected to continue in the future. Furthermore, one can assume that
the scope of the complaints will shift towards textile products (hand in
47
hand with the professed liberalization of trade in the textiles sector)
and products of a high-tech character, as this is one area in which
Taiwanese industry is becoming increasingly competitive.
Finally, it should be noted that even though the Community has
no official relationships with Taiwan, and Taiwan is not a member of
treated Taiwan de
GATT, the EC Institutions have practically always
48
signatories.
GATT
with
basis
equal
an
on
facto
3.

SAFEGUARD MEASURES

The EC Regulation on safeguards provides for the adoption of pro-

tective measures "where a product is imported into the Community in
such greatly increased quantities and/or such terms or conditions as to
cause, or threaten to cause, serious injury to Community producers of
like or directly competitive products."' 49 The wording is broad enough
to cover any form of protective action, but in practice the Community
authorities have thus far predominantly applied quantitative
restrictions.
While in earlier cases, e.g. Stoneware,50 Quartz Watches," t and
Urea, 52 the Community authorities adhered to the non-discrimination
47. In November, 1988 the EC Commission presented a report on trends in the textiles sector
in which it made a distinction between long-term and short-term trends. While the Commission
saw many positive signs for the long term, the Commission perceived a very worrisome trend for
the near future: the increase in exports from Asian and South Asian countries. The Commission
noted, however, that many developing countries had made progress in liberalizing their own
market and stated that if this trend continued, the EC would be prepared to liberalize its market
further, including possibly the abolition of the MFA. The EC textiles industry, however, is more
conservative and does not believe that the time is yet ripe for abolition of the MFA.
48. This is clear, for example, in the case of the textile agreements which the EC has concluded with a number of textile-producing developing countries within the framework of MFA.
As far as Taiwan is concerned, the Community did not conclude an agreement, but adopted a
Regulation which in fact closely mirrors the agreements concluded with GATT Members.
49. Council Regulation on Common Rules for Imports, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 35) 1
(1982) amended in 30 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C 37) 1 (1987).
50. Commission Regulation Introducing Protective Measures Concerning Imports of Stoneware, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 369) 27 (1982).
51. Commission Regulation Introducing Protective Measures Concerning Quartz Watches,
27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 106) 31 (1984).
52. Commission Regulation Concerning Imports of Urea, 29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 229)
8 (1986).
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principle in accordance with the relevant GATT law on the subject, in
more recent cases the Commission seems to be moving away from this
principle. In Slide Fasteners,53 only the imports from Taiwan were
subjected to protective measures. In the Footwear cases, 54 the proceeding was limited from the outset to Taiwan and Korea. While this
selectivity may be justified vis-A-vis Taiwan, which is not a member of
GATT, it would certainly seem to be in violation of article XIX of the
GATT as far as Korea is concerned. 55 In this respect, it is surprising
that, to the best of the author's knowledge, the Korean Government
seems to have accepted this discrimination without any protest.
4.

SHIPPING: THE HYUNDAI CASE

On January 4, 1989, the EC Council decided to levy a redressive
duty on containerized cargo transported by liner between the Community and Australia by the Korean Hyundai Merchant Marine Company. 56 This was the first time that the Council applied Regulation
57
No. 4057/86 on unfair pricing practices in maritime transport.
The Council decided that Hyundai had received the following noncommercial advantages:
-Benefits accruing to Hyundai from a Korean cargo Reservation
Scheme;
-Benefits received by Hyundai under the Shipping Industry Rationalization Plan (S.I.R.P.) which had been implemented by the Korean
Government as of 1984. Under this plan, Hyundai had allegedly
benefitted from a variety of support measures, including tax benefits,
debt moratoria on won loans and on foreign currency loans and the
refinancing of interest accrued during the moratoria.
The Council held that "the advantages were substantial enough to
make it possible for Hyundai to proceed in the way found in the investigation," i.e., to set "unfair" price levels. As Hyundai's prices had
caused injury to the EC industry, the Council decided to impose a
53. Commission Regulation Concerning Imports of Slide Fasteners, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 353) 11 (1987).
54. Commission Regulation Concerning Imports of Footwear into Italy, 31 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 54) 59 (1988); Commission Regulation Concerning Imports of Footwear into
France, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 166) 6 (1988); Notice of Initiation of an Investigation into
Imports of Footwear, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 215) 6 (1988).
55. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, openedfor signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
56. Council Regulation Introducing Redressive Duty of Containerized Cargo, 32 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 4) 1 (1989).
57. For a critical overview of the Regulation, see Bellis, Vermulst & Musquar, The New EEC
Regulation on Unfair Pricing Practices in Maritime Transport: A Forerunner of the Extension of
Unfair Trade Concepts to Services?, 22 J. WORLD TRADE 47 (1988); see also Eisner, Unfair Pricing Practices in Maritime Transport, 23 EUR. TRANSPORT L. 590 (1988).
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redressive duty of 450 ECU per twenty-foot container, corresponding
to the difference between Hyundai's freight rate and the normal freight
58
rate.
This author has elsewhere criticized the new Regulation as follows:
The new regulation is a hybrid of antidumping and countervailing duty
legislation. It takes the vague concept of "non-commercial advantage,"
presumably meaning subsidies in all their forms (and therefore not limited to countervailable subsidies in the sense of Track I of the 1979
GATT Subsidies Code) and uses the surrogate company methodology
(in a variation of the antidumping law as applied to non-market economy countries) to measure the benefit conferred by such advantages. By
not defining the term "non-commercial advantage" and by leaving the
Community authorities unlimited discretion in their selection of an appropriate surrogate company, the Regulation offers a great potential for
protectionist applications. 59
The Hyundai case shows that such fears were justified: the noncommercial advantages found by the Commission to have benefitted
Hyundai are very broad; the causal link required between the noncommercial advantages and the unfair pricing practices is very weak;
and the surrogate used by the Commission to compare Hyundai's
freight rates was a Swiss shipping company. 60
While the Hyundai case of course can be analyzed as a stand-alone
proceeding, it would seem more justified to consider it in the broader
context of the increasing "get tough" policy of the Community vis-Avis Korea - which is also apparent in other areas.
A final ironic note is that shortly after the Council found that Hyundai had received subsidies, the Commission approved subsidies to
German and French ships, as well as an aid system introduced in Denmark, as being in conformity with the common maximum production
aid ceiling in the Sixth Directive. 61 This Sixth Directive on state aid to
the shipbuilding industry had been adopted on January 26, 1987 and
provided for a maximum ceiling of twenty-six percent for large ships
and sixteen percent for small ships costing less than six million
62
ECUs.
58. Hyundai has challenged the Regulation before the European Court of Justice. See
Dawkins, Hyundai set to fight EC duties, at 10, col. 4, FIN. TIMES, June 30, 1989.
59. Bellis, Vermulst & Musquar, supra note 57, at 64.
60. Experience with the surrogate country concept in antidumping proceedings concerning
non-market economies has shown that comparing countries with very different GNPs leads to
findings of enormous dumping margins. Likewise, one can reasonably assume that a Swiss shipping company charges higher freight rates than a Korean shipping company, whether or not the
latter receives non-commercial advantages.
61. See Agence Europe, No. 4981 (Mar. 23, 1989) at 5; Agence Europe, No. 5058 (July 15,
1989) at 7.
62. Council Directive on Aid to Shipbuilding, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 69) 55 (1987).
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SUSPENSION TOWARDS KOREA

Like other developed countries, the European Community has a
Generalized System of Preferences which grants developing countries
preferential treatment in the form of reduced or zero import duties. In
1986, on the occasion of the mid-term review of that system for the
1981-1990 decade, the Community Institutions officially announced
for the first time that they would adopt a graduation policy, consisting
of the reduction or withdrawal of preferential treatment for certain
competitive suppliers of sensitive industrial products. This graduation
policy has expanded in scope over the years. For 1989, for example,
the EC decided - based on 1986-87 import statistics - to reduce by
fifty percent the fixed duty-free amounts in the case of five products
originating in Korea and seven products originating in Saudi Arabia.
Also in 1989, the EC decided to exclude altogether from preferential
treatment products from certain countries to which a fifty percent reduction of the fixed duty-free amounts had been applied in 1988. This
measure affected three products from Korea, two from Hong Kong
and one from Libya.
On December 18, 1987 the Council took a more far-reaching measure by adopting a Regulation suspending the EC's Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) with respect to Korea as of January 1, 1988.
Although not stated in the Regulation, the EC measure was the result
of strong lobbying efforts of CEFIC, the powerful European Association of Chemical Manufacturers, which had become irritated at the
Korean Government's failure to grant European companies protection
in the field of intellectual property similar to that extended to United
States' manufacturers in July 1986.
While there can be little doubt that the Korean Government did
accord American manufacturers preferential and, therefore, discriminatory intellectual property rights protection, one may nevertheless
question the desirability of using the GSP as a trade weapon. In the
opinion of this author, use of the new commercial policy instrument
would have been more logical because it was specifically designed to
deal with such situations. Indeed, initiation of a proceeding under this
instrument would have provided the EC with at least a mantle of legitimacy. The suspension of the GSP, on the other hand, amounts to
nothing less than blatant use of power politics.

6.

ARTICLE

115

MEASURES

For a variety of reasons there are still many national quotas in the
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Community. 6 3 Such quotas apply only to direct exports from particular countries. Once a national quota is filled, exporters in the third
country to which the quota applies (or their importers) may try to
export indirectly to that Member State through another Member
State. This is normally permitted under the principle of the free movement of goods: once a product is cleared through customs in any EC
Member State, it can move freely throughout the whole Community.
This may, of course, defeat the purpose of the national quota. For this
reason, article 115 of the EC Treaty allows the Commission to authorize Member States to take protective action against indirect exports in
derogation of the principle of the free movement of goods.
Article 115, which was intended to be used only in exceptional
circumstances, became an increasingly normal method of conducting
trade policy in the late seventies and early eighties. Recently, however, the Commission has exerted stricter control over the requirements for authorization under article 115. 64 This more aggressive
attitude has led to a substantial reduction in the number of authorizations under article 115 during the last few years. While in 1980 some
356 demands were introduced, this number decreased to 157 in 1988.
This change in policy was the result of decisions of the European
Court of Justice 65 and the logistics of the 1992 concept.
A closer look reveals changes not only in the number of authorizations, but also in the types of products involved. While in the early
eighties the vast majority of authorizations concerned textile products
(over seventy percent), the proportion of textile products in 1988 was
only fifty percent. For Korea and Taiwan, in particular, this is a sig66
nificant change, as the following table shows:

63. A substantial number of these are voluntary restraint agreements or voluntary export
restraints. Bourgeois, Antitrust and Trade Policy: A Peaceful Coexistence? European Community Perspective - II, 17 INT'L Bus. LAW. 115, 119 (1989) (citing a GATT Secretariat study,
stating that, between October, 1987 and April, 1988, 61 VRAs or VERs were in force to which
the EC was a party). Petersmann has concluded that "the EEC has become the main international user of 'grey area trade restrictions' in contravention of GATT Law." Petersmann,
Strengthening the Domestic Legal Framework of The GA TT Multilateral Trade System, in E.
PETERSMANN & M.

HILF, THE NEW GATT ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIA-

TIONS 33, 69 (1989).

64. See Commission Decision on Surveillance and Protective Measures in Respect of Imports
of Certain Products Originating in Third Countries and Put into Free Circulation in Another
Member State, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 16) 14 (1980); Commission Decision on Surveillance
and Protective Measures, 30 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 238) 26 (1987).
65. See, e.g., Donckerwolcke v. Procureur de la R6publique, 1976 ECR 1921; Tezi Textiel v.
Commission, 1986 ECR 887 [Tezi I]; Tezi Textiel v. Commission, 1986 ECR 889, 900 [Tezi II].
66. The table includes products affected by article 115 authorizations and takes into account
repeated authorizations.
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Products
Products

Korea
Korea

Taiwan
Taiwan

textiles
others
textiles
others
textiles
others
textiles
others

14
6
14
5
6
6
3
8

10
9
15
16
13
8
4
4

1986
1986
1987
1987
1988
1988
1989 (1-9)
1989 (1-9)

To a certain extent, however, this table is misleading. In the first
place, MFA IV, along with the bilateral agreements concluded within

its framework, provides for a number of measures which obviate the
need for article 115 authorizations. Secondly, the table does not take
into account the trade value of imports affected by article 115 authorizations. As Korea and Taiwan are increasingly focusing on production of micro-electronic high-tech products which fall under the
67
category of "others," such sectors might well be affected seriously.
7.

CONCLUSIONS

If one compares the economic performance of Taiwan with that of
Korea, two trends are worth noting. In the first place, the per-capita
GNP of Taiwan is substantially higher than that of Korea: USD 4,700
compared to USD 3,400.68 Secondly, the export surplus of Taiwan
with the EC is much higher than that of Korea. 69 Perhaps surprisingly in light of the above, Taiwan has succeeded in avoiding the attention of the EC industry and the EC authorities. While Taiwan has
received its share of antidumping (and safeguard) measures in the
Community, the value of trade affected by such measures does not
come close to that of actions taken against Korea. In other areas, Korea has also attracted more attention in the Community. The main
reasons for this difference have been indicated above: (1) the existence
67. Indeed, the 1989 (1-9) measures were aimed at car radios (France), color television receivers (France), television receivers (France), sewing machines (Spain), video cassette recorders
(Spain), cars (Spain), color televisions (Spain) and playing puppets (Spain) as far as Korea was
concerned, and tools and hand tools (Spain), colour television receivers (France), playing puppets (Spain) and television receivers (France) as far as Taiwan was concerned. Perhaps not surprisingly, most of the measures involved imports into Spain and France.
68. Report of the Section for External Relations, Trade and Development Policy on Relations Between the European Community and the Newly Industrializing Countries of South-East
Asia, 1070 CES 88, at 3, 15 (Mar. 20, 1989).
69. Supra note 4.
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of huge business conglomerates in Korea and (2) the Taiwanese specialization in the production of parts and components. A third reason
might be that a number of products in which the Koreans have become extremely competitive are also produced in Europe by large and
influential companies such as Philips (microwave ovens (MWOs),
compact disk players (CDPs), video cassette recorders (VCRs) and
color televisions (CTVs), BASF and AGFA (video tapes and audio
tapes).
That Korean products have been the subject of a variety of complaints in the Community, especially dumping allegations, does not
mean, however, that Korean producers have suffered as a result. In
most cases, they have been able to defend themselves very successfully
against the allegations of the EC industry, a record that compares very
favorably, for example, with that of Japan. Whether the combination
of increased labor costs and the appreciation of the won will allow
Korea to continue along this path remains to be seen.
For the moment, things are relatively quiet on the antidumping
front, arguably because of the buoyant state of the Community economy and the presence of a more free-trade-minded Commissioner on
External Relations. It seems, however, merely a question of time
before complaints will pick up again. It can be expected that such
complaints will continue to be aimed at newly-industrialized economies such as Korea and Taiwan - probably even more strongly than
before. Eventually, the economic structure of Korean business may
possibly help the country more than damage it: the Korean conglomerates can arguably set up production facilities within Europe more
easily than the scattered small and medium-size Taiwanese companies.
In the end, investing in the Community (with a sufficient percentage of
non-Korean or non-Taiwanese parts) is the only foolproof way of
maintaining access to the EC market.
In the beginning of this contribution, the author posed the question
to what extent the commitments to trade liberalization made in the
context of the Tokyo Round had been kept. Experience in GATT
would seem to have shown that decreases in direct protection are often
70
replaced by increases in indirect - more covert - protection.
Although one of the stated purposes of the Tokyo Round was to deal
with this phenomenon, and the Round indeed succeeded in producing
a number of important Codes on non-tariff barriers, it has paradoxically led many industrialized countries to take recourse to unfair trade
70. Compare C. GREY, TRADE POLICY AND THE SYSTEM OF CONTINGENCY PROTECTION
IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF COMPETITION POLICY (OECD 1986).
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laws (in the EC notably the antidumping law). As has been shown
elsewhere, 7' good arguments can be made that the unfair trade laws
are themselves unfair in that they contain a number of artificial elements, either in law or in practice, which inflate the likelihood of
dumping or injury findings. As more and more countries are starting
to adopt (and use) unfair trade laws and pattern such laws especially
after the laws of the United States and the European Community,
such laws have the potential of becoming the next biggest threat to the
multilateral free trading system. The containment and - if at all possible - the rolling back of some of the protectionist or irrational excesses of current unfair trade laws is therefore, in the author's opinion,
a top priority for negotiators in the Uruguay Round.

71. J. Jackson & E. Vermulst, supra note 9. Compare for the EC, Van Bael, EEC Antidumping Enforcement. An Overview of Current Problems, 1 EUR. J. INT'L L. (1990); Hindley,
Dumping and the Far East Trade of the European Community, II WORLD ECON. 445 (1988).

